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a cooperative social environment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; de 
Quervain et al., 2004). Although this may be so, the strategy of 
measuring one’s own gains against others also has a downside. In 
wealthy societies, a comfortable income can become unsatisfac-
tory if compared to an extravagant one: the millionaire envies 
the billionaire, and the billionaire envies still richer billionaires. 
This arms race of reward can in itself lead to inequity and social 
unrest, as in the rapid escalation of corporate executive compensa-
tion in recent years, which led to a backlash of widespread public 
indignation (Ariely, 2008).
The human tendency to see rewards in socially relative terms 
may therefore be a mixed blessing. If so, the question arises as 
to whether some people are capable of ignoring social considera-
tions and assessing a reward based on its intrinsic qualities alone. 
The willingness to sacrifice money to punish an unfair proposer is 
associated with affective responses, as measured by skin conduct-
ance responses (van’t Wout et al., 2006). These affective responses 
have specific neural correlates, identified in neuroimaging stud-
ies of social exchange. Unfair offers elicit greater activation in the 
anterior insula (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; King-Casas 
et al., 2008), an area linked to interoceptive function (Craig, 2002, 
2009; Critchley et al., 2004), and in particular to the emotion 
of disgust (Calder et al., 2001). Anterior insula activation scales 
inversely with offer size, and predict whether an unfair offer will 
IntroductIon
In rational accounts of human behavior, if a person is offered the 
choice of gaining a reward versus gaining nothing, they should 
always choose the reward. While this is typically true in a non-
social context, this account often breaks down during social interac-
tions. In the classic example of the Ultimatum Game, a “proposer” 
offers to split a sum of money with a “responder” in a two- person 
exchange. If the responder rejects the offer, both players get  nothing 
– hence, according to rational choice theory, responders should 
accept all non-zero offers. In reality, players are rarely so magnani-
mous. Responders typically reject offers in which the proposer’s 
share exceeds 80% of the total, preferring to gain nothing rather 
than accept an inferior share of the winnings (Guth et al., 1982; 
Bolton and Zwick, 1995). This sensitivity to fairness may be a 
uniquely human trait (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). For example, 
chimpanzees play the Ultimatum Game according to the dictates 
of rational choice theory, and are content with all non-zero offers 
irrespective of fairness (Jensen et al., 2007).
So why do human beings turn a perfectly good reward into 
a disappointment when others are getting more? One proposal 
is that the superficially “irrational” rejection of inferior shares 
is a costly but effective means of enforcing social norms (Boyd 
et al., 2003). Ultimately, the costs of giving up inferior shares are 
presumably outweighed by the long-term benefits of establishing 
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be rejected (Sanfey et al., 2003). These results suggest that rejec-
tion of unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game is driven by negative 
emotional reactions.
If some individuals had expertise in uncoupling such emotional 
reactions from their actual behavior, they might be better equipped 
to assess a reward on its own merits. Such individuals could poten-
tially be found among experienced practitioners of mindfulness 
meditation. Mindfulness meditation has its roots in a 2500-year-old 
Buddhist tradition, and has grown increasingly popular in Western 
societies over the last few decades. A central technique in mindful-
ness is to attend to the events in the present moment, on purpose, 
in a spirit of observation rather than judgment.
Meditation has been conceptualized as complex emotional regu-
latory training techniques developed for cultivation of well-being 
and emotional balance (Lutz et al., 2008a). Previous research on 
emotion regulation show that humans are able to exert a degree 
of control by reducing or enhancing emotional reactions elicited 
by various categories of stimuli and events in the world (Jackson 
et al., 2000; Ochsner et al., 2002; Ochsner and Gross, 2005; Eippert 
et al., 2007). Based on these previous studies we hypothesized that 
successful regulation of negative emotional reactions would lead 
to increased acceptance rates of unfair offers in the Ultimatum 
Game. In line with this hypothesis, we expected that meditators 
would exhibit greater acceptance rates for highly asymmetric offers.
Recent neuroimaging studies suggest some convergence between 
the neural correlates of social exchange and mindfulness medita-
tion. Voxel-based morphometry studies demonstrate higher gray 
matter volumes in the anterior insula of meditators versus age-
matched controls, suggesting long-term effects of meditation (Lazar 
et al., 2005; Holzel et al., 2008; Luders et al., 2009). The mid and 
posterior aspects of the insular cortex are activated during medita-
tive states (Farb et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008b, 2009). In addition, 
even a short course of mindfulness training is effective in decou-
pling the activity of the insula from the activity of other regions 
involved in social decision-making, such as the medial prefrontal 
cortex (Farb et al., 2007; Tang et al., 2009). Taken together, these 
findings suggest that experienced mindfulness meditators could be 
capable of regulating emotional and social considerations in their 
evaluation of rewards in the Ultimatum Game.
Specifically, we hypothesized that the key anatomical locus 
for such regulation would be attenuation of the anterior insula 
responses toward unfair offers in meditators compared with controls. 
Furthermore, we expected that meditators would attend to internal 
bodily states in order to successfully regulate negative emotional reac-
tions to unfair monetary offers. In accordance with previous studies 
we expected that elevated interoceptive awareness would involve brain 
regions such as the posterior parts of the insula and somatosensory 
cortices (Farb et al., 2007; Lutz et al., 2008b, 2009; Tang et al., 2009). 
Conversely, we expected that non-meditator controls might rely more 
on medial cortical areas linked to prospection and theory of mind, 
in line with previous studies (Rilling et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003).
To test these hypotheses, we recruited a group of experienced 
mindfulness meditators and a control group of non-meditators. 
We enrolled subjects in the study to play the role of responders in 
an anonymous version of the Ultimatum Game (Figure 1), while 
undergoing fMRI. We report both the behavioral and the neuroim-
aging findings resulting from the experiment.
MaterIals and Methods
subjects
Sixty-six subjects participated in the study. Subjects were 
recruited in two groups. One group (n = 40) consisted of con-
trols (21 females/19 males). The second group (n = 26) consisted 
of expert meditators (10 females/16 males). Practitioners had 
various degrees of regular experience ranging from 6 month to 
24 years. Common to all practitioners were that they practiced 
Buddhist meditation while maintaining a secular life incorpo-
rating a career, family, and friends. See Table 5 for comparison 
of demographic variables. It should be emphasized that hav-
ing more control subjects (n = 40) than meditators (n = 26) 
does not compromise the validity of the behavioral or neural 
tests, on the contrary, this improves our power for detecting 
any between group differences by decreasing the standard error 
on the characterization of the response profile for controls. All 
subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and none 
had a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, and no 
current use of psychoactive medications. All procedures were 
conducted in accordance with the Institutional Review Board 
at Baylor College of Medicine. Both groups completed pre-scan 
questionnaires to assess potential differences between groups. 
There were no significant differences between groups on Beck 
Anxiety Inventory (two sample t = −1.63; df = 64; p < 0.1), and 
Beck Depression Inventory (two sample t = 0.67; df = 64; p < 0.5). 
As expected significant differences emerged between groups 
as assessed by two mindfulness questionnaires: Mindfulness 
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS; Brown and Ryan, 2003; two 
sample t = 2.70; df = 64; p < 0.008), and Kentucky Inventory of 
Mindfulness Skills (KIMS; Baer et al., 2004; two sample t = 2.47; 
df = 64; p < 0.01).
experIMental procedures
Participants played responders during 45 rounds of an anonymous 
version of the Ultimatum Game. Prior to scanning, participants 
were instructed in the task and were subsequently given a test to 
ensure that the nature and rules of the game were comprehen-
sible to all participants. The offers were splits of $20. On each 
round, the participants saw a bar graph with an offer (e.g., “Tom 
proposes: $9 you $11 Tom”; Figure 1B). The offer screen had a 
duration of 6 s. Next the participants were presented with the 
choice: “Accept ($9) Reject ($0),” which was presented for 3 s in 
which subjects made a response using a button-box. A red box 
placed around one of the choices indicated that a decision was 
made. Finally, a jittered inter-trial interval was presented (2–4 s). 
Participants had a button-box in each hand and were instructed 
to press with either left or right hand corresponding to the pre-
ferred choice, which was presented on left and right side of the 
screen. Position of the “accept” and “reject” choices on either left or 
right side was held constant within subjects, and counterbalanced 
across subjects. Thirty rounds were played with human partners 
and 15 with computer partners. Participants received offers in a 
predetermined fashion: 6 × $19:1, 6 × $18:2, 6 × $17:3, 6 × $16:4, 
6 × $15:5, 3 × $14:6, 3 × $13:7, 3 × $12:8, 3 × $11:9, 3 × $10:10. 
The sequence of offer presentations was randomized across par-
ticipants. Participants were presented with an identical range of 
offers in human and computer rounds.
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by participants indeed had consequences for partners on each 
round of the game. In reality, all the proposals were predetermined 
similar to other neuroimaging studies using the Ultimatum Game 
(Sanfey et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; 
Crockett et al., 2008).
A categorization of fair and unfair offers was made based 
on empirical data from previous studies of Ultimatum Game 
responses showing that offer sizes above 30% of the total sum 
are typically accepted (Guth et al., 1982; Thaler, 1988; Novak 
et al., 2000). The data in the present study displayed similar 
acceptance ratios. Proposals of 30% of the total sum (corre-
sponding to the $14:6 offer sizes in the present study) displayed 
acceptance rates of 88% (std = 5.04) for meditators, and 95% 
The stimuli were presented at a screen resolution of 1024 × 768 
pixels. Stimuli were presented and responses collected using NEMO 
(Human Neuroimaging Lab, Baylor College of Medicine). The stim-
uli were back-projected via an LCD projector onto a transparent 
screen positioned over the subjects’ head and viewed through a 
tilted mirror fixed to the head coil.
Prior to the experiment participants were told that the offers 
presented in the human rounds had been made by proposers 
in a previous experiment, i.e., that the offers were real, and that 
proposers would be paid according to the decision made by the 
participants. It was made explicit to participants that they would 
play a different person on each round. This served as a cover story 
to enhance the ecology of the game, i.e., that the choices made 
FIguRe 1 | (A) 40 controls and 26 meditators played responders in the 
Ultimatum Game. Subjects choose on each round to accept or reject a monetary 
split of $20 made by a new partner on each round. (B) Trial outline for the 
Ultimatum Game. Each trial started with a jittered fixation period (2–4 s) followed 
by an offer to split $20 (6 s). Finally subjects indicated the decision to accept or 
reject the offer (3 s). A red box highlighted the choice being made on each trial. 
(C) Behavioral results from the Ultimatum Game – meditators (red) displayed 
significantly higher acceptance rates for the most asymmetric offers from 
human partners ($19:1 and $18:2) compared to controls (blue). The mean and 
SEM are plotted.
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were based on a single-voxel t-statistic or cluster-level corrected 
corresponding to p < 0.05 corrected for multiple comparisons 
with an extent threshold of >10 voxels (unless otherwise stated). 
Where cognitive conjunctions were used a threshold of p < 0.001, 
uncorrected was applied. The coordinates of all activations are 
reported in MNI space.
A ROI analysis in bilateral anterior insula was identified using 
the coordinates provided by a previous study (Sanfey et al., 2003). 
Coordinates from this study were transformed from Talairach space 
to MNI space (www.mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk). A spherical mask with 
a 5-mm radius centered at [35 15 4] and [−33 14 0] was used to 
extract the time-series from bilateral anterior insula for human tri-
als. A correlation analysis was computed to explore if the anterior 
insula co-varied with individual differences in terms of the percent 
acceptance rates for the most unfair offer conditions ($19:1 and 
$18:2) for each group separately. The first-level beta values using the 
regressors of interest ($19:1 and $18:2) were averaged and entered 
into a regression analysis at the second level.
A second ROI analysis was performed for bilateral anterior insula 
using identical parameters as in the previous ROI except that both 
fair (i.e., $10:10–$14:6) and unfair offer sizes (i.e., $19:1–$15:5) 
were included in the analysis. Consistent with previous models 
the offer onset was modeled as single impulse response functions 
including the 6-s epoch following the offer. Beta values within this 
ROI were extracted and mean ± SE were computed for each group 
and plotted in fair and unfair bins.
In order to explore if unfair human offers differed according to the 
decision to accept or reject an unfair offer, we separated the data into 
subsequent decision to accept or reject unfair human offers. Specifically, 
using the coordinates from the interaction analysis for human trials 
[Meditators Unfair > Meditators Fair] > [Controls Unfair > Controls 
Fair] centered in the right posterior insula [48 −28 20] constituting 
29 voxels, we extracted the mean ± SE beta values within this region 
according to subsequent decision.
We performed a linear regression (separately for the two groups) 
to explore individual differences in trait mindfulness levels as 
measured by the MAAS and the KIMS. We regressed a behavioral 
measure of the size of the MAAS and KIMS for each individual 
on a neural measure of the impact on posterior insula activity. 
Specifically, the neural measure was given by the estimated beta 
value at peak voxels from the right posterior insula derived from 
the contrast [Meditators Unfair > Meditators Fair] > [Controls 
Unfair > Controls Fair]. Each individual was an observation.
behavIoral results
We first asked whether meditators were less likely than controls to 
reject opportunities for monetary gain during asymmetric offers 
in the Ultimatum Game when playing with human partners. In 
accordance with previous findings (Guth et al., 1982; Bolton and 
Zwick, 1995; Sanfey et al., 2003), both meditators and controls 
tended to accept offers that were relatively symmetrical ($10:10–
$14:6; Figure 1C). Likewise, both groups showed an increasing 
tendency to reject monetary rewards as the offers became more 
asymmetric, overall ($15:5–$19:1). However, the two groups 
showed a bifurcation of acceptance rates for the most asymmetric 
offers ($18:2 and $19:1). Compared to controls, meditators were 
significantly less likely to reject opportunities for monetary gain 
(std = 2.99) for controls for human conditions. These two lines 
of evidence support a categorization of fair ($10:10–$14:6) and 
unfair ($19:1–$15:5) offers.
At the end of the experiment, participants were paid according 
to the decisions they made on one randomly selected round. In 
addition participants were paid a flat fee of $20 (to cover park-
ing expenses and compensation for completing paperwork). 
Participants were informed about this payment method prior to 
the experiment.
fMrI data acquIsItIon
The anatomical and functional imaging was performed using 
3 Tesla Siemens Trio scanners. High-resolution T1 weighted scans 
were acquired using an MPRAGE sequence (Siemens). Functional 
imaging used an EPI sequence with a repetition time (TR) of 
2000 ms, echo time (TE) = 25 ms, flip angle = 90°, 220 mm field 
of view (FOV), 64 × 64 matrix. Functional slices were oriented 30° 
superior–caudal to the plane through the anterior and posterior 
commissures in order to reduce signal drop-out due to magnetic 
field in-homogeneities (Deichmann et al., 2003). Each functional 
image was acquired in an interleaved way, comprising thirty-
seven 4 mm axial slices for measurement of the blood oxygena-
tion level-dependent (BOLD) effect (Ogawa et al., 1990), yielding 
3.4 mm × 3.4 mm × 4.0 mm voxels.
fMrI data analysIs
Image pre-processing and data analysis was performed using SPM2 
(Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK). 
Motion correction to the first functional scan was performed using 
a six parameter rigid-body transformation (Friston et al., 1996). 
The average of the motion-corrected images was co-registered to 
each individuals structural MRI using a 12 parameter affine trans-
formation. Slice timing artifact was corrected, after which images 
were spatially normalized to the Montreal Neurological Institute 
(MNI) template provided in SPM2. Images were then spatially fil-
tered with an 8-mm isotropic Gaussian kernel and for the analysis 
a high pass filter with a cut-off frequency at 1/128 Hz was applied.
Following pre-processing a general linear model (GLM) was 
applied to the fMRI time-series that time-locked single impulse 
response functions at offer onset including the 6-s epoch following 
the offer. The model included 20 regressors, which modeled the 
10 human offer conditions and the 10 computer offer conditions. 
Results from the computer conditions will be summarized in a 
separate paper. Residual effects of head motion were corrected for 
by including the six estimated motion parameters for each subject 
as regressors of no interest. The model was convolved with the 
canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF; Friston et al., 
1998). The mean images from the first-level analysis were entered 
into a second-level, random effects (RFX) analysis accounting for 
the between subject variance. An ANOVA model using the beta 
estimates of the regressors of interest was used. Equal variance 
was not assumed, thus SPM2’s options for non-sphericity cor-
rection was applied (Glaser and Friston, 2004). Using t-contrasts 
allowed us to test for correlations of the fMRI BOLD signal and 
the parameters of interest. The resulting t maps were subsequently 
transformed to the unit normal z-distribution to create a statisti-
cal parametric map for each contrast. The statistical results given 
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occipital gyrus (Figure 2; Table 1). Conversely, meditators showed 
significantly greater activity than controls in bilateral mid- and 
posterior insula and bilateral posterior parietal cortex (PPC; 
Figure 2; Table 1).
We next performed a contrast to identify brain regions showing 
a significant interaction between group (meditator versus control) 
and offer type (unfair versus fair). In this contrast, meditators dis-
played a different response profile from controls in the right post-
central gyrus and right posterior insula (Figure 3A; Table 4). Mean 
beta values for the activation in the right posterior insula scale lin-
early with unfairness in meditators (Figure 3C), but not in controls 
(Figure 3D). Furthermore, in meditators only, right posterior insula 
activity was predictive of the subsequent decision to accept or reject 
an unfair offer (Figure 3B). Meditators showed significantly greater 
activity in this region when unfair offers were later rejected (paired 
t = 4.8; p < 10–6). In controls, no such distinction was apparent 
(paired t = 0.3; p < 0.7). The converse interaction displayed activity 
in the right supramarginal gyrus (Table 4). We estimated a linear 
regression of the impact of right posterior insula against a behavioral 
measure of each individual’s score on two mindfulness scales. We 
employed the MAAS and KIMS as both of these scales has in previ-
ous studies been applied as a measure of trait levels of mindfulness 
(Brown and Ryan, 2003; Baer et al., 2004; Creswell et al., 2007). We 
performed the correlation separately for meditators and controls. 
The analysis showed that right posterior insula correlated with indi-
vidual differences in trait mindfulness levels in the meditator group 
(MAAS; R = 0.55, p = 0.001. KIMS; R = 0.6, p = 0.001; Figures 3E,F). 
This correlation was absent in controls (MAAS; R = 0.18, p = 0.1. 
KIMS; R = 0.21, p = 0.1; Figure not shown).
Previous studies have associated activity in the anterior insula 
with responders’ negative emotional response to an unfair offer 
(Sanfey et al., 2003). We therefore performed an ROI analysis in 
for the two most asymmetric offer conditions ($19:1; two sample 
t = 2.44, df = 64, p < 0.01. $18:2; two sample t = 2.39, df = 64, 
p < 0.01). In absolute terms, meditators were willing to accept a 
$19:1 split on 54% of trials, while controls were willing to accept 
this same division on only 28% of trials. Similarly, meditators were 
willing to accept an $18:2 split on 61% of trials, while controls were 
willing to accept this split on only 42% of trials. Hence, for the most 
asymmetric offers, meditators were more likely than controls to 
accept an opportunity for personal monetary gain, notwithstanding 
the larger gains accruing to their partners on these trials.
neuroIMagIng results
Our behavioral findings suggested a difference between meditators 
and controls in the response to asymmetric (unfair) offers. For 
each group, we therefore began by identifying the brain areas that 
showed a difference in activity during the offer period for unfair 
($15:5–$19:1) versus fair ($10:10–$14:6) offers. In meditators, 
greater activation for unfair offers appeared in the bilateral poste-
rior insula, right postcentral gyrus, ACC (BA 32), left mid- anterior 
insula, thalamus, and cerebellum (Table 2). By contrast, controls 
displayed greater activity in bilateral anterior insula/inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG), bilateral medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10), bilateral ACC 
(BA 24/32), bilateral middle temporal gyrus, right supramarginal 
gyrus, and cerebellum (Table 3). To test for common areas activated 
by unfairness in both meditators and controls, we performed a 
conjunction analysis. This analysis revealed a common response 
to unfairness in the left ACC (BA 24/32).
Having established the neural correlates of unfairness in each 
group, we performed a direct contrast of the neural responses to 
unfair offers between the two groups. In this contrast, controls 
showed significantly greater activity than meditators in the left 
dorsal striatum, left lingual gyrus, bilateral precuneus, and middle 
FIguRe 2 | Within group (A,B) and across group (C,D) main effects of unfair 
offers. (A) Controls (Ctr) displayed more activity in bilateral superior temporal 
sulcus (STS), anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), bilateral inferior frontal gyrus (IFG)/
anterior insula (AIns), and superior frontal gyrus (MPFC) for unfair offers relative 
to fair offers by human partners. (B) Significant activity to unfair versus fair offers 
was found in meditators (Medi) in the thalamus (Thal), bilateral posterior insula 
(PIns), left mid-anterior insula, and ACC. Direct comparison between unfair offers 
across groups: (C) Left precuneus (Prc), left dorsal striatum (DStr), and 
lingual-occipital gyri (LG) are shown overlaid on coronal and sagittal sections. 
(D) Bilateral mid insula (MIns) and bilateral posterior insula (PIns) are shown on 
separate coronal sections. The activations are FDR-corrected. The ACC is 
displayed at p < 0.001, uncorrected to illustrate the extent of the activation.
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controls versus rational meditators we found elevated activity in 
bilateral DLPFC (Left: z = 3.15; −32 48 28; p < 0.001, uncorrected. 
Right: z = 3.09; 36 48 20; p < 0.001, uncorrected; Figure 5, left 
panel). In the opposite contrast [meditators > controls] we did 
not observe activity in the DLPFC, but found activity in the left 
postcentral gyrus extending into the posterior insula (z = 4.51; −52 
−20 40; p < 0.001, uncorrected), the left posterior superior temporal 
cortex (pSTC; z = 3.65; −48 −56 12; p < 0.001, uncorrected), and 
bilateral parahippocampal gyrus (Left: z = 3.91; 32 −40 −16. Right: 
z = 3.73; −28 −40 −16, p < 0.001, uncorrected; Figure 5, right panel).
dIscussIon
A rational economic agent, homo economicus, should in theory 
accept all non-zero offers in the Ultimatum Game, since any amount 
of reward is better than nothing. However, in reality, human beings 
have a strong tendency to measure their rewards against the rewards 
of their peers. This tendency is often described as a characteristically 
human form of irrational behavior (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). 
Yet in this study, we identified a population of human beings who 
play the Ultimatum Game more like homo economicus. Experienced 
meditators were willing to accept even the most asymmetrical offers 
on more than half of the trials, whereas control members of homo 
sapiens did so just over one-quarter of the trials.
In dual-process accounts of human decision-making, sepa-
rate “rational,” and “emotional” systems compete to control the 
outcome of human decisions (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981; St. 
Evans, 2008). Neuroimaging studies have suggested that these 
two systems may have distinct neural correlates. For example, 
intuitive or  emotion-driven decisions tend to be associated with 
greater activity in medial prefrontal and medial orbitofrontal cor-
tical areas and their striatal counterparts, while more rational 
or deliberative decisions tend to be associated with a shift in 
activity toward more lateral prefrontal and parietal areas and 
their striatal counterparts (Goel and Dolan, 2003; Greene et al., 
2004; McClure et al., 2004). Hence, when comparing medita-
tors to control subjects, we might have expected to see a shift 
in activity from medial to lateral prefrontal cortical areas in 
 meditators playing the Ultimatum Game. In reality, the neuroim-
aging results showed quite a different pattern. During decision-
making, control subjects activated a network of areas including 
medial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and superior 
temporal sulcus (Figure 2A; Table 3). This network was largely 
consistent with that seen in previous neuroimaging studies of 
the Ultimatum Game, and other tasks involving social cognition 
and theory of mind (Sanfey et al., 2003; Amodio and Frith, 2006; 
Adolphs, 2009). In sharp contrast, meditators showed activity 
in an entirely separate network, which comprised  primarily the 
mid- and posterior insula and ventral posterior thalamus 
(Figure 2B; Table 2). Rather than social cognition and theory of 
mind, these areas are more typically associated with interoception: 
the representation of the body’s internal state (Craig, 2002, 2009). 
Specifically, a representation of the body’s internal state is mapped 
by afferents through the ventromedial thalamic nucleus to the 
sensorimotor cortex and the mid/posterior insula (Craig, 2002).
Strikingly, there was very little overlap in activity between medi-
tators and controls. The left ACC (BA 24/32) was the only region 
activated in a conjunction analysis between controls and medi-
this region to assess its response to unfair offers in meditators and 
controls. Using the coordinates of the study cited above, we placed 
a 5-mm spherical ROI in the bilateral anterior insula and extracted 
beta estimates for fair and unfair offers in each group. In controls, 
the right and left anterior insula showed significantly higher activ-
ity for unfair versus fair offers (Left: paired t = 3.4, p < 10−4. Right: 
paired t = 2.6, p < 0.008). However, no such differences were seen 
in meditators (Left: paired t = 1.3, p < 0.2. Right: paired t = 0.7, 
p < 0.4; Figures 4D,E). Furthermore, left anterior insula displayed 
a significant difference between unfair offers in controls compared 
to meditators (two sample t = 1.9, p < 0.05). There were, however 
no such difference between unfair offers in controls compared to 
meditators in the right anterior insula (two sample t = 0.8, p < 0.4). 
Importantly, there was no difference in bilateral anterior insula 
between fair offers in the two groups.
We also sought to determine whether neural activity in the 
anterior insula ROIs could predict individual subjects’ acceptance 
rates for the most unfair offers ($19:1 and $18:2). Control subjects 
with stronger anterior insula activation for unfair offers showed 
lower acceptance rates for these offers (Left: R = −0.41, p = 0.004, 
one-tailed. Right: R = −0.45, p = 0.002, one-tailed; Figure 4B). 
However, in meditators, this was not the case. Neural activity in the 
anterior insula did not predict acceptance rates for unfair offers in 
the meditator group (Left: R = −0.23, p = 0.12, one-tailed. Right: 
R = −0.31, p = 0.06, one-tailed; Figure 4C).
We finally made a comparison between the participants who on 
average accepted >85% of the most unfair offers ($19:1 and $18:2). 
This process yielded a subdivision of the most rational participants 
from the control group (n = 9) and meditator group (n = 14). We 
expected that rational controls would recruit the DLPFC as previ-
ous studies have demonstrated that the DLPFC reduces subjects’ 
willingness to reject unfair offers in the Ultimatum Game (Sanfey 
et al., 2003; Knoch et al., 2006). In a contrast between rational 
Table 1 | Between-group main effects of unfair offers for human 
conditions.
Region Voxels t-Value MNI
   x  y  z
[MeDITAToRs uNFAIR > CoNTRoLs uNFAIR]
Right mid/posterior insula 14 4.20 44  −4  8
Left mid/posterior insula 40 4.15 −44  −4  8
Right posterior insula 16 3.97 36  −28  20
Left posterior insula 62 4.51 −44  −24  20
Right posterior parietal cortex (PPC) 23 4.05 20  −64  40
Left posterior parietal cortex (PPC) 33 4.52 −32  −69  32
[CoNTRoLs uNFAIR > MeDITAToRs uNFAIR]
Right middle occipital gyrus 46 5.86 24  −96  4
Left middle occipital gyrus 63 6.30 −28  −92  0
Left lingual gyrus 21 4.94 −16  −64  −4
Right precuneus 11 4.38 16  −76  28
Left precuneus 13 4.60 −4  −52  56
Left dorsal striatum  11 4.11 −12  4  12
Activations are displayed at p < 0.05, FDR-corrected. Extent threshold > 10 
voxels.
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Instead, they drew upon the posterior insula and thalamus: areas 
usually linked to visceral, emotional rather than rational, delibera-
tive functions.
The behavioral difference between meditators and controls was 
significant for the most asymmetric offers (Figure 1C). Focusing on 
unfair trials, a direct contrast of activation between the two groups 
showed illuminating differences in neural activity (Figures 2C,D). 
tators. So, when playing the Ultimatum Game,  meditators were 
distinct from controls not only in their decision-making behavior, 
but also in its underlying neural correlates. However, although the 
meditators played the game more like the rational homo economi-
cus, they did not draw upon the network of lateral prefrontal and 
parietal regions typically seen for mathematical and logical reason-
ing (Duncan et al., 2000; Goel and Dolan, 2003; Lee et al., 2006). 
FIguRe 3 | Meditation-specific activity in posterior insula. (A) Significant 
interaction effect in meditators compared with controls in response to unfair 
offers ($19:1–$15:5) relative to fair offers ($10:10–$14:6). Activity was significant 
in right posterior insula for this contrast. (B) Average beta estimates from 29 
voxels in the right posterior insula during the 6-s period following the offer are 
plotted according to subsequent decision to accept or reject unfair offers 
($19:1–$15:5). Activity in this region is driven by unfair offers that are rejected 
relative to accepted in meditators. In contrast, no such response is significant in 
controls. (C,D) Average beta estimates from the voxels in the right posterior 
insula. The plots display a linear scaling with size of unfairness in meditators, 
which is not present in controls. Mean ± SE are plotted in increments of $2 bins. 
Activity within the right posterior insula in meditators is significantly correlated 
with individual differences in trait mindfulness levels as measured by (e) the 
Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) and (F) the Kentucky Inventory 
of Mindfulness Skills (KIMS). The Pearson correlation coefficient (R) is given in 
the plot. Each data point represents a subject.
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FIguRe 4 | RoI analysis in anterior insula. (A) Plots of beta estimates drawn 
from 5 mm ROIs in left anterior insula based on coordinates from a previous study 
(Sanfey et al., 2003). Activity within the left anterior insula is plotted against 
acceptance rates for the most unfair offer sizes ($19:1–$18:2) for each participant 
separately for (B) controls and (C) meditators. The Pearson correlation coefficient 
(R) is given in the plot. Each data point in the plot represents a subject. A similar 
correlation pattern was found for right anterior insula in both groups (not shown). 
(D) Controls display a significant difference between fair ($10:10–$14:6) and unfair 
($19:1–$15:5) offers in the left anterior insula. (e) The meditator group shows no 
significant differences between fair and unfair responses in the left anterior insula.
FIguRe 5 | Comparison between a subset of participants that play the 
ultimatum game like rational agents; controls (n = 9) and meditators 
(n = 14). The main effect [Controls > Meditators] display elevated activity in 
bilateral DLPFC, whereas in the opposite contrast [Meditators > Controls] the 
left postcentral gyrus (PCG) and left posterior superior temporal cortex (pSTC) 
are displayed.
Controls responded to asymmetric offers by engaging the precuneus 
and a dorsal region of the caudate nucleus. This specific region of 
the precuneus figures prominently in studies of episodic memory 
and prospection (the construction of imaginary or future personal 
scenarios; Buckner and Carroll, 2007; Addis et al., 2009; Spreng 
et al., 2009). The dorsal caudate region also appears as a specific 
neural correlate of “fictive error,” or the difference between actual 
and optimal reward, during financial decision-making (Lohrenz 
et al., 2007). Hence, control subjects may be assessing asymmetric 
offers in terms of past or hypothetical future scenarios and fictive 
losses. Furthermore, the dorsal striatum is elevated during altruistic 
punishment of defectors in an economic exchange (de Quervain 
et al., 2004), presumably reflecting signals to punish norm violators, 
which in the current study may explain controls’ increasing rejec-
tion rates to the most asymmetric offers, compared with meditators. 
In contrast, meditators showed greater activity in the insula and 
PPC: areas more closely linked to interoception and attending to 
the present moment (Critchley et al., 2004; Farb et al., 2007). There 
exist physiological evidence from previous meditation studies that 
the left insula is predominantly responsible for parasympathetic 
control (Lutz et al., 2009; Tang et al., 2009), whereas the right insula, 
which we observed in the interaction between group (meditator 
versus control) and offer type (unfair versus fair; Figure 3), has in 
several studies been proposed to play a role in attending to internal 
bodily states (Craig, 2003). Previous meditation studies have found 
right insula involvement in focused attention to internal experi-
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Table 2 | Within group main effects of unfairness for human conditions 
[meditators unfair > meditators fair].
Region Voxels t-Value MNI
   x  y  z
Left ACC (BA 32) 24 3.80 −4  44  8
Left mid/anterior insula 12 3.55 −36  4  8
Right posterior insula 83 4.58 32  −24  16
Left posterior insula 89 4.13 −32  −24  16
Right postcentralgyrus 11 4.02 20  −44  68
Thalamus: 28  
Right ventroposterior lateral nucleus  3.80 16  −20  4
Right ventral lateral nucleus  3.43 16  −16  12
Right/left medial dorsal nucleus  3.65 4  −12  4
Left cerebellum 20 4.82 −8  −52  −8
Activations are displayed at p < 0.05, FDR-corrected. Extent threshold > 10 
voxels. AAC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann area.
ences (Holzel et al., 2008), and momentary self-reference (Farb 
et al., 2007). Based on these findings it is likely that meditators 
particularly during unfair offers were better able than controls to 
maintain interoceptive awareness, e.g., attending to internal bodily 
states. This interpretation is further supported by the finding that 
posterior insula is significantly correlated with behavioral measures 
of mindfulness trait levels in meditators in the direction of being 
more engaged in those meditators with higher mindfulness scores 
as measured by the MAAS and KIMS.
In the subset of participants who tended to accept the most 
unfair offers we found increased activity in bilateral DLPFC for 
controls, presumably reflecting the higher cognitive demands in 
order to overcome the emotional tendency to reject an unfair 
offer (Figure 5). The involvement of the DLPFC in playing the 
Ultimatum Game like homo economicus is well known (Sanfey et al., 
2003; Knoch et al., 2006). This result is also consistent with recent 
studies associating the DLPFC with self-control (Hare et al., 2009) 
which provide an anatomical base for successful self-regulation in 
rational controls. Yet the subset of rational meditators displayed 
activity in a different set of regions suggesting that they were not 
motivated by economic self-interest. This group recruited the 
somatosensory cortex, pSTC, and the parahippocampal gyrus. The 
somatosensory cortex is reported in studies requiring mapping of 
subjective feeling states arising from bodily responses (Critchley 
et al., 2004; Lutz et al., 2008b, 2009). Whereas the pSTC is involved in 
shifting attention to focus on another’s perspective (Behrens et al., 
2008; Hampton et al., 2008) as well as related to altruistic behavior 
(Harbaugh et al., 2007; Tankersley et al., 2007).
Table 3 | Within group main effects of unfairness for human conditions 
[controls unfair > controls fair].
Region Voxels t-Value MNI
   x  y  z
Right IFG/anterior insula 49 4.29 32  20  −8
Left IFG/anterior insula 50 3.83 −44  24  −8
Right medial frontal gyrus (BA 9/10) 22 5.44 8  60  16
Left medial frontal gyrus (BA 10) 11 5.16 −8  60  20
Right ACC (BA 24/32) 21 4.40 8  28  24
Left ACC (BA 32) 15 4.22 −4  36  24
Right superior frontal gyrus (BA 8) 18 4.82 16  32  56
Right superior temporal sulcus (STS) 69 4.52 48  −28  −8
Left superior temporal sulcus (STS) 44 4.37 −52  −40  −4
Right supramarginal gyrus 75 5.70 60  −52  28
Right cerebellum 14 4.52 24  −76  −32
Activations are displayed at p < 0.05, FDR-corrected. Extent threshold > 10 voxels. 
IFG, inferior frontal gyrus; AAC, anterior cingulate cortex; BA, Brodmann area.
Table 4 | group × offer type (unfair, fair) interactions for human conditions.
Region Voxels t-Value MNI
   x  y  z
[MeDITAToRs uNFAIR > MeDITAToRs FAIR] > [CoNTRoLs uNFAIR > CoNTRoLs FAIR]
Right posterior insula 29 3.82 48  −28  20
Right postcentral gyrus (BA 3) 16 3.79 20  −44  72
[CoNTRoLs uNFAIR > CoNTRoLs FAIR] > [MeDITAToRs uNFAIR > MeDITAToRs FAIR]
Right supramarginal gyrus 38 4.06 48  −56  32*
Activations are displayed at p < 0.001, uncorrected. Extent threshold > 10 voxels. *Significant at p < 0.05 after whole brain cluster correction with a t-threshold of 
3.1 and an extent of 36 voxels.
Table 5 | Demographic variables of controls and meditators.
 Controls (n = 40) Meditators (n = 26)
Age 36.8 (10.1) 40.4 (10.4)
Female:male 21:19 10:16
SES 49.9 (8.4) 48.3 (12.1)
Meditation experience (years) – 9.5 (7.8)
Mean demographic variables were compared using two-sample t-tests assuming 
unequal variance. SD in parentheses. No significant differences (p < 0.05) 
between controls and meditators were found. SES; social economic status.
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free dollar over no money at all, rather than reject the reward due 
to its unfavorable social context. Proximately, meditators seem to 
avoid generating aversive responses in the anterior insula during 
unfair offers. In controls, such responses are powerful predictors of 
rejecting offers during social interaction, but in meditators, these 
responses are largely absent during the Ultimatum Game. Future 
studies should assess whether blunting of the high-level emotional 
representation of the anterior insula is an automatic interoceptive 
response based on acquired mindfulness skills. Our results suggest 
that the lower-level interoceptive representation of the posterior 
insula is recruited based on individual trait levels in mindfulness. 
When assessing unfair offers, meditators seem to activate an almost 
entirely different network of brain areas than do normal controls. 
Controls draw upon areas involved in theory of mind, prospec-
tion, episodic memory, and fictive error. In contrast, meditators 
instead draw upon areas involved in interoception and attention 
to the present moment.
The rejection of asymmetric rewards is often seen as an impor-
tant tool for enforcing social norms and encouraging cooperative 
behavior (Fehr and Gachter, 2002). Unfortunately, it can also have 
the opposite effect. Siblings, schoolchildren, and CEOs have all 
been known to worry more about their competitors’ rewards than 
their own – with unhappy social consequences for everyone else. 
This study suggests that the trick may lie not in rational calculation, 
but in steering away from what-if scenarios, and concentrating on 
the interoceptive qualities that accompany any reward, no matter 
how small.
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Meditators and controls also showed a marked difference in the 
activity of the anterior insula during the Ultimatum Game. The ante-
rior insula has previously been linked to the emotion of disgust (Calder 
et al., 2001), and plays a key role in social norm violations, rejection, 
betrayal, and mistrust (Rilling et al., 2002; Spitzer et al., 2004; King-
Casas et al., 2005; Montague and Lohrenz, 2007). In previous studies 
of the Ultimatum Game, anterior insula activity was higher for unfair 
offers, and the strength of its activity predicted the likelihood of an offer 
being rejected (Sanfey et al., 2003). In the present study, this was true 
for controls, but not for meditators. In control subjects, the anterior 
insula became active in response to unfair offers, and individuals with 
higher anterior insula activity tended to reject more of such offers 
(Figures 4B,D). However, in meditators, the anterior insula showed 
no significant activation for either fair or unfair offers, and there was 
no significant relationship between anterior insula activity and offer 
rejection (Figures 4C,E). Hence, meditators were able to uncouple the 
negative emotional response to an unfair offer, presumably by attend-
ing to internal bodily states reflected by activity in the posterior insula. 
This relationship was not apparent in control subjects. Meditators may 
not experience unfair offers as social norm violations, as suggested by 
their higher acceptance rates for asymmetric offers.
One limitation of the present study is that it employed a cross-
sectional rather than longitudinal design. Hence, it was not possible 
to compare the behavior of the subjects before and after they started 
practicing meditation. Without this information, we cannot yet deter-
mine whether the meditators actually acquired a different behavioral 
profile through meditation experience, or whether the meditation 
group is simply a highly selected subset of a rare behavioral phenotype 
within the general population. Future work may help to determine 
whether a structured program of meditative training can produce the 
observed changes in social cognition and decision-making.
To summarize, we have identified a population of human beings 
with an unusual tendency to behave more like rational economic 
agents in the Ultimatum Game. Specifically, these experienced 
meditators are roughly twice as likely as controls to say yes to a 
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